Global Oil Resources and the Persian Gulf: Security and Democracy by Chapman, Duane
1 
 
WP 2003-40 
December 2003 
 
 
 
Working Paper 
 
Department of Applied Economics and Management 
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York  14853-7801  USA 
 
 
 
Global Oil Resources and the Persian Gulf: 
Security and Democracy 
 
Duane Chapman 
 
 2 
 
 
 
It is the Policy of Cornell University actively to support equality of 
educational and employment opportunity.  No person shall be denied 
admission to any educational program or activity or be denied employment 
on the basis of any legally prohibited discrimination involving, but not limited 
to, such factors as race, color, creed, religion, national or ethnic origin, sex, 
age or handicap.  The University is committed to the maintenance of 
affirmative action programs which will assure the continuation of such 
equality of opportunity. 
3 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
To Neha Khanna (Cornell and Binghamton Universities), for her significant contributions 
to earlier work used here, and for her comments on this paper; to Darwin Hall (California State 
University at Long Beach) for encouraging that earlier work; to Susan Greaves in Cornell’s Olin 
map library for the very useful Figure 1; to Steven Reiss here for his outstanding research and 
manuscript assistance; and to Richard Fullerton (U.S. Air Force Academy) and Matthew 
Evangelista (Cornell) for their comments and criticism.  Previous versions of this paper have 
been presented at the U.S. Air Force Academy, Cornell Aerospace (ROTC) Studies, Cornell 
Peace Studies Program, U.S. Ecological Economics Association Annual Meeting, Department of 
Ecology-Iran, and the Western Economic Association International Annual Meeting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
fn: Global Oil WP 03-40 1-27-04 
 4 
Abstract 
 The oil of the Persian Gulf has been of considerable interest to oil companies and 
Western governments (and to Russia) for more than a century.  Remaining global conventional 
crude oil resources are on the order of 3 trillion barrels, with more than 50% of that amount in 
the Persian Gulf.  Since 1986, a price range framework has resulted in stable crude oil prices and 
reliable supply.  In economic terms, it is a Nash game theory equilibrium between Gulf 
producers and Western (and Asian) consumers.  Military support is an important part of the 
system. 
 Given the very low cost of production in the region (about $5 per barrel) and the great 
magnitude of resources, the oil wealth in the Gulf is on the order of $60 trillion.  It is the 
existence of past and potential efforts to seize this resource which creates a major policy problem 
for the 8 countries in the region and for global security.  The security framework which made a 
stable world oil market possible has itself contributed to growing instability in individual 
countries, the rise of Al Qaeda, and the U.S. occupation of Iraq. 
There are three broad policy approaches to this dilemma.  The dominant policy in the 
1973-1990 period was generally a “hands off” position by the U.S. and Europe.  In the years 
following the Gulf War (1991-current) a security system has been organized and led by the 
United States.  A third type of security structure would be essentially international.  The paper 
concludes by discussing each approach in the context of 6 conditions or requirements for 
democratic governments and a stable world oil market.  
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Introduction 
 
The map (Figure 1) illustrates the interactions of Persian Gulf oil and international 
security.  Within this image are (a) 5 countries with nuclear weapons, (b) 3 countries where U.S. 
forces are engaged in military conflict, (c) the nationalities of 18 of the 19 hijackers who 
undertook the September 11, 2001 attacks, (d) more than three-fourths of the world’s readily 
accessible proved petroleum reserves and more than half of the estimated total remaining oil, and 
(e) the location of 6 major recent armed conflicts that did not involve the United States. 
I.  Brief History:  Petroleum, the Persian Gulf, and the West 
Today’s issues with security and oil have long roots.  Turkey’s Ottoman Empire 
controlled most of the region at different periods over a 7-century span in the last millennium.  
The slow disintegration of the Empire was accelerated by the search for oil for naval vessels by 
Britain and France early in the 20th Century.  In the years after WWI, much of the oil regions of 
the Persian Gulf was under the production control of Western oil companies.  Initially British 
Petroleum and the French Petroleum Company dominated the region, reflecting the European 
concern for secure sources of petroleum.  By the 1950's, however, American oil companies had 
become full partners.1  The organization of Western oil concessions was typical of natural 
resource production areas throughout the developing world for the time.  One observer described 
the early oil concessions in this way: 
“One would have a clear conception of the situation in Persia if one could imagine that 
Russian officers command the National Guard, French professors lecture in French, the 
Dutch own and manage the only bank, with a branch in every county, employing a large 
number of Indians.  The British own and manage the only large industrial operation (oil). 
 People would resent this state of affairs and try to change it.”2
                                                          
1 See Figure 2 and Tables 1 and 2.  Russia and the Soviet Union during this period sought to establish influence in 
the Persian Gulf, but were generally unsuccessful except for brief periods in Iran and Iraq. 
 
2 Adapted from JM. Upton, The Modern History of Iran (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), page 32.  
Also pages 83-86 in D. Chapman, Energy Resources and Energy Corporations (Ithaca NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1983). 
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 Figure 1.  Persian Gulf Region 
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Table 1.  Persian Gulf Countries:  Notes on Government and Colonial History 
  
Bahrain British Protectorate from 1861 until independence in 1971. Monarchy.  Al 
Khalifa family rule since 1783.  Constitution, National Assembly created in 
1973.  National Assembly dissolved in 1975.  In 1993, Consultative Council 
of appointed members formed.   Government friendly to U.S. 
 
Iran  Monarchy with significant British influence and parliamentary democracy to 
1951.  Conflict over oil nationalization until parliament democracy displaced 
by  Shah monarchy in 1953 with assistance of US-CIA.  Revolution in 1979 
replaced Shah with an Islamic Republic, a combination of clerical theocracy 
and electoral democracy. The supreme spiritual leader has final authority in 
all executive, legislative, and judicial matters.  Executive branch headed by an 
elected president.  The Majlis is the legislative Consultative Body.  Different 
parts of government hostile or open towards U.S.* 
 
Iraq  Turkish control until 1906.  A British mandate after WWI.  Monarchy 
overthrown in 1958 by army with communist support.  Ba’ath Socialist Party 
took control in 1968 with minor assistance from US-CIA.  Saddam Hussein 
established dictatorship in 1979.  Government hostile to U.S. until American 
occupation in 2003. 
 
Kuwait British protectorate until independence in 1961.  Monarchy.  Al Sabah family 
rule.  Constitution in 1962 vests power in an emir selected from ruling family. 
Elected National Assembly exists but subject to dissolution or suspension by 
the emir.  Government friendly to U.S. 
 
Oman  Independence from Portuguese control in 1650.  British protectorate from 
1789 until 1951.  Monarchy.  Al Said family rule.  In 1991, a Consultative 
Council of regional representatives was formed.  Government friendly to U.S. 
 
Qatar  Ottoman control from 1878 until World War I.  British Protectorate until 
independence in 1971.  Monarchy.  Al Thani family rule. In 1999 municipal 
elections were held.  Government Friendly to U.S. 
 
Saudi  Independence from the Turkish Empire after WWI.  Unification in 1932. 
Arabia  Monarchy.  Al Saud family rule.  No elections or political parties.  
Consultative Council of appointed members initiates laws and reviews policy.  
  Government friendly to U. S. 
 
United   Independence from Britain in 1971.  Confederation of monarchies.   
Arab  Rulers of 7 constituent states (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, 
Emirates Umm al-Qaiwain, Ras al-Khaimah, and Fujairah) participate in a Supreme 
  Council which elects the President for 5 year terms.  The Federal National 
Council is appointed.  Government friendly to U.S. 
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Notes to Table 1 
 
Primary Source:  US-CIA, The World Factbook 2002; Accessed 3/2/03 - 4/4/03, 
<http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>.  Other Sources:  Arthur S. Banks & 
Thomas C. Muller, Political Handbook of the World (Binghamton, NY: CSA Publications, 1999).  
Encyclopedia Britannica Online; Accessed 3/2/03-4/4/03; <http://eb.com/>.    Lord Kinross, The 
Ottoman Centuries (New York City:  Morrow, 1977).  George T. Kurian, Enyclopedia of the Third 
World, (New York City: Facts on File, 1992).  Roger Morris, “A Tyrant in the Making”, New York 
Times, March 14, 2003.  Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup:  The Struggle for Control of Iraq (New 
York City: McGraw-Hill, 1979).  Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies 
and the World They Made (New York City: Viking, 1975).  Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest 
for Oil, Money, and Power (New York City: Simon and Schuster, 1992). “*” means author’s opinion. 
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Table 2.  Historical Summary:  Security, Production, Pricing 
 
 
Broad Era   Military Security     Production & Pricing Decisions 
 
I.  WWI to 1950’s    Britain  British Petroleum (BP) 
 
II.  1950’s to 1973    none  Aramco,* BP, Shell, 
 a. Suez Canal 1956                                                     CFP, Texaco 
 b. OPEC Oil Embargo 1973        
 
III.  1973 – 1986    none     OPEC 
 a. Iraq invades Iran oilfields, 1980 
b. Bush Sr./Saudi price agreement, 1986 
 
IV.  1986 – 1990    none     OECD/OPEC first 
 a. Iraq invades Kuwait, 1990                                       target price range 
b. repulsed by U.S. led UN coalition, 1991 
 
V.  1991 – 2002    U.S./U.N. OECD/OPEC second 
                                                                                                target price range 
 
VI.  2003 – current    U.S.  OECD/OPEC continue 
                                                                                                second price range 
 
VII.  (please see conclusion)   3 options 3 options 
 
*Note: ARAMCO was the Arab-American Oil Company which operated in Saudi Arabia.  The partners were 
Standard of California (Socal/Chevron) and Texaco, since merged; and Exxon and Mobil, also merged.  See Figure 
2. 
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Figure 2.  1972 Joint Oil Production Companies Composition
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Iran - Consortium Iraq - IPC Saudi Arabia -
Aramco
Saudi Arabia -
Kuwait Oil Co.
Abu Dhabi - Abu
Dhabi Marine
Abu Dhabi - Abu
Dhabi Petrol
BP
40% BP 
23.75%
BP
50%
BP
66.67%
BP
23.75%
Shell
14%
Shell
23.75%
Shell
23.75%
Exxon 7%
Exxon
11.875%
Exxon
11.875%
Mobil 7%
Mobil
11.875%
Exxon
30%
Mobil 10%
Mobil
11.875%
Gulf 7%
Gulf
50%
Texaco 7%
Texaco
30%
Socal 7% Socal
30%
CFP 6%
CFP
23.75%
CFP
33.33%
CFP
23.75%
Other 5% Other 5% Other 5%
Source:  Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies And the World They Made (New York: Viking, 1975), page 136.
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II.  The Tradeoff:  Price Stability and Military Security 
American and European oil companies managed production in the Persian Gulf much the 
same way as in Texas or the North Sea.  However, the 1973 Arab-Israeli war created a surge of 
antagonism in the Arab world against the U.S. and Europe.  The OPEC nations, led by Saudi 
Arabia, seized the authority to control oil production within their countries.  Their efforts to raise 
oil prices were initially successful, nearly reaching $40 per barrel, but had collapsed by 1986 
with crude prices at $10 per barrel. 
In 1986 then-Vice President George H. Bush went to the Persian Gulf and worked with 
the Saudi King and government to stabilize oil prices at a higher level.  The price range 
framework which was created in 1986 is essentially the price structure which exists today: see 
Figure 3.  All 12 years are within 75 cents of the first target range, except the 1990 price when 
Iraq invaded Kuwait.  The new price range of $23-$30 was established in 2000; it is equivalent 
to the old $15-$20 range adjusted for inflation.  The collapse of the old price range in 1998 was 
influenced by the economic recession in Asia in that year, the 300% increase (from 1996 to 
1998) in Iraq’s oil output, and the inflation-reduced value of revenues generated under the old 
price range.  The most recent three years are all within the new range, as is the 2003 average to 
date. Persian Gulf production costs are $5 per barrel or less (see Table 12 below). 
Why, then, do the Gulf countries not pursue a low-price policy which would increase 
their sales, market share, and perhaps their revenues?  When prices are below $15, the normally 
slow rate of production decline in the U.S. falls more rapidly as high-cost facilities are shut down 
and drilling plummets.  American oil producers’ revenues are affected twice: first by reduced 
production, and second by a lower price.  With very low prices, American oil companies will not 
encourage the U.S. government to support the existing Persian Gulf governments.  At low oil 
prices, petroleum companies move to influence American policy to raise prices, as in 1986 and 
1998. 
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Figure 3.  Target Price Ranges: Old and New
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except Iraq-Kuwait, 1990
NEW $23 - $30 RANGE, 
2000 - Current
OLD $15 - $20 RANGE, 
1986 - 1997
NO TARGET RANGE,
1998 - 1999
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In contrast, with very high oil prices, American consumers and oil-using businesses 
dominate American policy.  Congressmen from states without oil production call for termination 
or reduction of military support for Persian Gulf governments.  American policy considers 
withdrawing military and political support of the Gulf governments at either extreme of the price 
spectrum.3 
 The Gulf governments understand these reactions, and the potential threat to their 
security if prices are outside the target range.  Table 3 summarizes several of the political, 
economic, and military factors which work to keep prices within the range, currently $23-$30.  It 
is a system which economists describe as a Nash equilibrium.4  Neither side can improve its 
overall situation by working to move crude prices outside the price range. 
Iraq’s invasions of the oil regions of Iran (1980) and Kuwait (1990), if successful, would 
have gained for Iraq control of nearly half of known oil reserves and a fourth of total remaining 
resources (see Table 9 below).  Success in these two invasions would have led to an Iraq 
influence, control, or occupation of the remainder of the Gulf countries.  In this case, Iraq 
would have held three-fourths of known global reserves and one-half of remaining oil. 
 
III.  Military Security, Nuclear Weapons, Al Qaeda 
In reaction to these concerns, Persian Gulf governments undertook major military 
expansion in the 1990s.  In one three-year period, three Gulf countries purchased $32 billion in 
weaponry (see Table 4).  The total population in these three countries (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
UAE) was about 25 million.  In other words, these three countries expended more than $1,000 
per capita on arms, 13% of their Gross Domestic Product. 
                                                          
3 As noted above, when oil prices were very low, the goal of then-Vice President George H. Bush in his 1986 visit 
to Saudi Arabia was clearly to raise oil prices to protect American producers and their support for him (Yergin, 
pages 755-758).  The role of Congressmen from oil consuming states was evident in 2000 in a period of high prices 
(e.g., New York Times March 2, 19, 23, & 29; 2000). 
 
4 After the Nobel prize winner John Nash who pioneered game theory concepts. 
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Table 3: General Economic Impact of Crude Oil Price Decision–Making  
in a Game Theory Price Range Framework 
 
 
Price per barrel 
 
OECD Countries 
 
Persian Gulf Oil Producers 
$15 or less • higher GNP growth 
• shut some domestic production 
• greatly increased oil consumption 
• much more imports 
• more pollution, climate change 
• end Persian Gulf political support 
by OECD oil industry 
• loss of political support from 
OECD oil industry 
• lower revenue, greater volume 
• internal economic problems 
• faster depletion 
• higher market share 
$23 - $30 • stable GNP growth 
• stable OECD oil production 
• slow growth in oil consumption 
• slow growth in import share 
• stable prices 
• ANWR production feasible 
• continued Persian Gulf support 
• continued OECD political, military 
support 
• stable revenue, rent 
• stable market share 
• cooperation with OECD oil industry 
 
$40 • decline in GNP growth 
• rapid near-term growth domestic 
production 
• stable or declining consumption 
• ANWR production profitable 
• OECD Persian Gulf support 
opposed by oil consumers 
 
• loss of OECD political, military 
support 
• increased incentives for Central 
Asia, other non-OPEC production 
• less market share 
• less production, more profit, rent 
• greater payoff to successful Iraq-
type action 
11 
Table 4.  Value of Arms Transfer Deliveries by Major Supplier and Recipient Country 
(Cumulative 1994-1996, millions of current dollars) 
 
       Supplier 
 
      Recipient  
Total US UK Russia France Germ- 
any 
China Other 
NATO 
Middle 
East 
Other 
East 
Europe 
Other 
West 
Europe 
Other 
East 
Asia 
All 
Others 
World 119,565 67,210 16,405 8,490 6,675 4,045 1,970 4,610 3,070 2,130 2,485 595 1,880 
Developed 
US 
Israel 
Russia 
France 
Germany 
Japan 
52,070 
3,330 
2,865 
50 
695 
2,710 
6,020 
38,760 
- 
2,600 
30 
550 
2,600 
6,000 
1,355 
950 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
845 
40 
0 
- 
0 
0 
0 
2,160 
160 
0 
0 
- 
0 
0 
3,025 
320 
150 
0 
0 
- 
0 
40 
40 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1,990 
950 
5 
0 
40 
60 
0 
1,310 
330 
0 
0 
5 
10 
0 
180 
30 
10 
20 
0 
0 
0 
1,370 
140 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
200 
200 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
835 
170 
80 
0 
80 
0 
0 
Developing 
China 
Taiwan 
67,495 
2,565 
4,090 
28,450 
120 
3,330 
15,050 
0 
0 
7,645 
2,000 
0 
4,515 
0 
775 
1,020 
0 
0 
1,930 
- 
0 
2,620 
0 
0 
1,760 
320 
0 
1,950 
30 
0 
1,115 
0 
0 
395 
0 
0 
1,045 
80 
0 
OPEC 
Iran 
Kuwait 
Saudi Arabia 
UAE 
36,080 
1,025 
3,405 
26,585 
2,270 
15,150 
0 
1,900 
11,700 
800 
12,915 
0 
675 
11,200 
260 
1,625 
320 
750 
0 
200 
3,040 
0 
60 
2,000 
750 
190 
0 
0 
60 
0 
525 
500 
0 
0 
0 
940 
10 
0 
775 
0 
85 
10 
0 
0 
0 
310 
80 
20 
0 
20 
860 
10 
0 
850 
0 
150 
50 
0 
0 
40 
290 
5 
0 
0 
200 
NATO 25,525 18,150 1,195 230 1,300 1,470 40 1,785 580 45 275 200 255 
Source:  Prepared by Neha Khanna; from Chapman and Khanna, 2001, op. cit. 
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 The importance of military policy and prices was noted above first with respect to the 
price range framework, and then again in the context of Iraq’s attempt to control Persian Gulf 
Oil. Table 5 shows another dimension of this relationship.  There is a strong correlation between 
arms trade and petroleum trade.  Weapons exporters are likely to import oil (R = .74),5 and oil 
exporters are likely to import weapons (R = .70). 
 Nuclear weapons are increasing in countries near the Persian Gulf; see Table 6.  There is 
no current threat to Gulf oil production or shipment with nuclear warheads as of this writing.  
The many conflicts in nearby countries have existed independently of Persian Gulf oil.  
However, nuclear weapons capability might at a future date be utilized by Israel, Pakistan, or 
India.  Each could threaten Persian Gulf oil production or transport to encourage greater U.S. and 
European involvement in the Kashmir and Middle East conflicts.  The small possibility of a 
fundamentalist government assuming power in Pakistan translates into an equally small but real 
possibility that Pakistan could employ a nuclear threat against Gulf countries, or shipping, or 
American naval vessels and bases in the Gulf.6 
Since any civilian nuclear power program can be the basis for manufacturing nuclear 
weapons, Iran’s nuclear power development creates the potential for future weapons capability. 
It is well known that 17 of the 19 September 11, 2001 hijackers were born in Persian 
Gulf countries.  In addition, 7 of the 9 apparently highest-ranking leaders of the Al Qaeda 
organization are from Saudi Arabia or its neighbors.7 The May 2003 attacks against Westerners 
in Saudi Arabia were made primarily by Saudis.  Bin Laden and Al Qaeda apparently see the 
governments of Saudi Arabia and the other southern Gulf nations as semi-colonial agents of the 
United States.  In part, the Al Qaeda political program is focused on the goal of replacing the 
Persian Gulf monarchies because of their strong association with the U.S.8 
                                                          
5 Tables 4, 5, and 6 were prepared by Neha Khanna and used earlier in D. Chapman and N. Khanna, “An Economic 
Analysis of Aspects of Petroleum and Military Security in the Persian Gulf,” Contemporary Economic Policy, 
October 2001, 19(4): 371-381. 
6 A point we made in Chapman and Khanna 2001, page 379. 
7 Osama bin Laden, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Walid Ba’Attash, 
Mustafah Muhammed Ahmad, and Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi. 
8 CNN March 1997 interview with Osama bin Laden, especially transcript pages 1, 2, and 5. 
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Table 5: Correlation Coefficients 
 
Correlation of 
 
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient 
 
Arms exports       with     Oil imports 
Arms imports       with     Oil exports 
Total arms trade   with     Total trade 
Total arms trade   with     Total oil trade 
Total trade           with     Total oil trade 
 
0.74 
0.70 
0.69 
0.80 
0.81 
 
Variable definitions: All data are for 1995 
Arms exports (imports): value of conventional weapons exports (imports) 
Arms trade:                   sum of arms exports and arms imports 
Oil imports (exports):    total volume of crude oil and refined petroleum products imports   
                                     (exports) 
Total trade:                   total value of merchandise imports and exports 
 
Source: Chapman and Khanna, 2001, op. cit. 
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Table 6: Nuclear Weapons Capabilities 
Name and history Arsenal 
(number of warheads) 
Representative Missile Range 
(miles) 
1.  Countries with nuclear weapons capabilities 
United States 
First test: 1945 
Total number of tests: 1,030 
 
United Kingdom 
First test: 1952 
Total number of tests: 45 
 
France 
First test: 1961 
Total number of tests: 210 
 
Russia 
First test: between 1945-1952 
Total number of tests: 715 
 
China 
First test: 1964 
Total number of tests: 45 
 
India 
First test: 1974 
Total number of tests: 6 
 
Israel 
Known to have bomb 
 
Pakistan 
Began secret program in 1972 
 
North Korea 
 
12,070 
 
 
 
380 
 
 
 
500 
 
 
 
22,500 
 
 
 
450 
 
 
 
65 
 
 
 
64-112 
 
 
15-25 
 
 
? 
8,100  
 
 
 
7,500 
 
 
 
3,300 
 
 
 
6,800 
 
 
 
6,800 
 
 
 
1,500 
 
 
 
930 
 
 
930 
 
 
? 
2.  Countries that terminated nuclear weapons programs 
 
Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, South Africa.   
 
Source: Chapman and Khanna 2001. 
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To date there is no indication of competent Al Qaeda interest in nuclear weapons, 
although a minor initiative was discovered and terminated.9  It would seem a likely possibility 
that Al Qaeda or similar groups would seek to work with fundamentalist Islamic political groups 
to gain control or influence over Pakistani nuclear weapons.10   
 
IV.  Global Oil Resources and the Persian Gulf; U. S. Imports 
Tables 7 and 8 show the concepts that are utilized in estimating world oil resources.11  
The total remaining resource estimate of 2.855 trillion barrels (in Table 8) is the sum of three 
components.  “Known Reserves” (similar in meaning to “Proved Reserves”) are relatively firm 
values used in developing near-term production plans.  It is the minimum amount of crude oil 
that may be expected to be produced from a field or reservoir. 
 “Potential Reserve Expansion” is a best-guess estimate of future production at an existing 
site which exceeds the proved reserves figure.  As geological techniques have improved, 
potential reserve expansion has become more important in petroleum resource planning.   It is a 
probabilistic concept.  For an existing field under production, remaining resources would be the 
sum of “Known Reserves” and “Potential Reserve Expansion.” 
“Undiscovered Resources” is a term used by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS).  It 
could be roughly translated “Approximate probability distribution estimates of oil resources in 
areas which have not been explored in detail.”  In general, it is a category which relies on 
extrapolation.  Suppose Area A is a region that has been producing for many years and has been 
extensively investigated.  Known reserves are set at 500 million barrels.  Area B is the same size 
with apparently identical geology.  The undiscovered resource for Area B may have a mean 
estimate of the same 500 million barrel figure, with a 95% probability of at least 400 million 
barrels, and a 5% probability of 600 million barrels. 
                                                          
9 Jose Padilla is reported to have met with Al Qaeda members, and studied radiological weapons on the internet.  
Baltimore Sun, September 12, 2002; Washington Post, June 15, 2002. 
10 New York Times, November 1 and December 17, 2001.  Seymour Hersh, “Watching the Warheads,” November 5, 
2001 New Yorker, pages 48-54. 
11 Tables 7-9 and Figure 4 build upon recent work by Chapman or Chapman and Khanna.  That work, in turn, uses 
basic data from the U.S. Geological Survey. 
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Table 7.  Concepts in Resource Definition 
 
A.  Proved Reserves – Economically recoverable conventional crude oil at known fields and reservoirs, 
estimated directly by engineering as well as geological data.  Similar to an inventory 
concept. 
 
B.  Potential Reserve 
     Expansion – 
Identified reserves expected to be developed in existing fields through improved recovery, 
extensions, revisions, and the addition of new reservoirs and pools. 
C.  Undiscovered Resources – Geological extrapolation of potential crude oil based upon knowledge of geological 
formations outside existing fields.  A probabilistic concept. 
D.  Total Remaining 
      Resources – 
 
An estimate of total conventional crude oil available for recovery; the sum of the 
preceding categories. 
E.  Original Endowment – The amount of oil existing before production began in 1859.  It combines the amount of 
cumulative production to date with the remaining resources estimate. 
Sources:  USGS, “1995 National Assessment of United States Oil and Gas Resources,” USGPO 1995.  D. Chapman, “World Oil:  Hotelling Depletion or Accelerating 
Use?” Nonrenewable Resources, Journal of the International Association for Mathematical Geology, Winter 1993, 2(4). 
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Table 8.  Probability 5% of Remaining World Oil Resources 
(billion barrels) 
 
 
 
 
 
Category 
 
 
Amount 
Known Reserves     883 
Potential Reserve Expansion 
 
 
   682 
Undiscovered Resources 1,290 
Total Remaining Resources 2,855 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The 2000 Assessment data used a January 1, 1995 benchmark date.  Production in the 8 years 1995-2002 was 
192 billion barrels, implying a current remaining resource estimate of 2,663.  World cumulative production 1859-
2002 has been 931 billion barrels, implying an original endowment of 3.6 trillion barrels.  The table is a revision of 
Table 1 in D. Chapman, “A Review of the New Undiscovered Conventional Crude Oil Resource Estimates and Their 
Economic and Environmental Implications,” Cornell AEM Working Paper 2001-22, December 2001.
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These assessments are developed for individual regions throughout the world.  A real 
example for Russia: in Western Siberia, the Togur-Tyumen Petroleum System has 5 fields.  The 
95% probability estimate is 2.3 billion barrels, and the 5% probability estimate is 14.7 billion 
barrels.  For all of Russia, the USGS analyzed 45 assessment units with 331 oil fields.  The 
results: 95% probability of 25 billion barrels, and a 5% probability of at least 148 billion barrels; 
this, recall, in the “Undiscovered Resource” category. 
Figure 412 shows the changing nature of the probability distributions for “Original 
Resources,” the 5th category in Table 7.  At every probability level, the estimates have increased. 
 For the latest assessment, the range between high probability low resource estimates and low 
probability high oil resource estimates has increased.  For the 5% probability level, the estimate 
of original endowment has grown by 1.5 Tbl (trillion barrels).  Petroleum resources in the 
Persian Gulf are shown in Table 9.13 (The terminology in Table 9 uses the concepts explained in 
the discussion of Tables 7 and 8.)  The dominant position of the Persian Gulf countries is 
evident.  The region holds 76% of known reserves and 54% of estimated total remaining 
resources. 
 Since Persian Gulf oil costs are on the order of $5 per barrel, and U.S. and European 
costs are on the order of $20 to $25 for new fields,14 the importance of the Gulf region in 
quantity of resources is multiplied by its uniquely low production costs. 
In the long run these factors will increase in importance.  The U.S. including Alaska is 
past its production peak, and production levels in the U.S. will continue to decline.  North Sea 
production is probably at its maximum.  In contrast, the Persian Gulf has produced a much 
smaller proportion of its original endowment than has the U.S.: 11% versus 38%.  As American 
and world oil consumption continues to grow, the role of the Persian Gulf countries will continue 
to increase in importance, in both quantity and value. 
A closer look at the U.S. (Tables 10 and 11) illuminates the global importance of the 
Persian Gulf.  U.S. imports are growing rapidly: nearly 4% annually.  Two primary factors create  
                                                          
12 Figure 4 is from Chapman 2001, op. cit. 
13 The 5% high resource estimates are used in Table 9 because the author assumes (a) the Figure 4 probability 
distributions will continue shifting rightward for some time, and (b) at some future date the real price of oil will pass 
$50, creating new incentive for increased recovery.  
14 See discussion of costs below, and Table 12. 
19 
 Figure 4.  Change in Probability Distribution of Original Resource 
 Endowment Estimates 
 
20 
 
Table 9.  Persian Gulf, 2000 Assessment, billion barrels 
 
Country 
Cum. 
Prod. 
Known 
Reserves 
Reserve 
Exp. 
Undis. 
Resources 
Original 
Endow. 
Rem. 
Resource 
RR % 
World 
Bahrain 0.9 1.1 0.8 1.7 4.5 3.6 0% 
Iran 33.7 105.0 74.8 100.5 314.0 280.3 10% 
Iraq 22.4 100.1 71.3 83.9 277.7 255.6 9% 
Kuwait & NZ 31.0 93.6 66.6 7.2 198.4 167.4 6% 
Oman 3.6 7.3 5.2 7.3 23.4 19.8 1% 
Qatar 5.0 9.2 6.6 6.4 27.2 22.2 1% 
Saudi Arabia 72.8 283.5 201.9 160.9 719.1 646.3 23% 
UAE 15.7 72.9 51.9 15.5 156.0 140.3 5% 
Total Persian 
Gulf 185.1 672.7 479.0 383.4 1,720.2 1,535.1 54% 
% World 26% 76% 70% 30% 40% 54%  
 
World 
 
708 
 
883 
 
682 
 
1,290 
 
3,563 
 
2,855 
 
100% 
Row 539 859 612 1,107 3,117 2,578 90% 
U.S. 169 24 70 183 446 277 10% 
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Notes to Table 9 
1. Reserve expansion in Persian Gulf extrapolated from ratio of total Rest of World Expansion (612) to Known 
Reserves (859), or .712. 
2. Suppose reserve expansion in Persian Gulf extrapolated as 94.3% of mean undiscovered: 612/649 from FIG AR-
5 in Assessment 2000.  Association of Reserve Expansion with Undiscovered Resources is obvious.  Reserve 
Expansion= 193.1, instead of 479.0 in table. 
3. Some rows and columns do not add exactly because of rounding. 
4. Iraq’s goals in the last 25 years: Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.  These four constitute 66% of known reserves, 
61% of reserve expansion, and 47% remaining resources; worldwide. 
5. Current consumption per year: World, 24/25 Bbl.; U.S, 7 Bbl.; U.S. production: 2.1 Bbl.  Imports, 3.4B crude, 
.8B refined, .7B  NGL. 
6. “Rem. Resources” means remaining resources, the sum of the second, third, and fourth columns:  “Known 
Reserves”, “Reserve Expansion”, and “Undiscovered Resources”. 
 
Sources:  USGS, “World Petroleum Assessment 2000 – Description and Results,” 2000, website www.usgs.gov.,  
USGS, “National Assessment,” op. cit., U. S. Minerals Management Service, “Outer Continental Shelf Petroleum 
Assessment,” 2000, website www.mms.gov. 
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Table 10.  Basic U.S. Petroleum Data (billion barrels) 
 
 
  
1995 
 
2002 
 Annual 
Changes 
Consumption  6.47  7.21  +2.2% 
Exports  .35  .36  +0.6% 
Imports 
 
 
 3.22  4.21  +5.5% 
Domestic Production Total  3.15  2.94  -1.4% 
   Alaska  .54  .36  -7.8% 
   Lower 48  1.85  1.74  -1.2% 
   Natural Gas Liquids; Other  .76  .84  +2.0% 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  Each entry includes both crude oil and petroleum products.  Source is Monthly Energy Review, October 
2003.  
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Table 11.  U.S. Petroleum Imports, Major Sources, 2002 
 
           
    kbl/d   Mbl/y        % U. S.  
                 Total    
 
 
*Saudi Arabia  1,553      567   14% 
*Iraq       442      161     4% 
*Other Persian Gulf    259        95     2% 
*Total Persian Gulf 2,254      823   20% 
 
Canada   1,939      708   17% 
Mexico   1,532      559   13% 
*Venezuela   1,383      505   12% 
*Nigeria      596      218     5% 
UK       477      174     4% 
Norway      379      138     3% 
*Angola      326      119     3% 
*Algeria      269        98     2% 
*Colombia      256        93     2% 
Russia      202        74     2% 
Other 15 Countries           1,745       637   15% 
 
 
Total 33 Countries        11,358    4,146  100% 
 
 
Notes:  imports are overwhelmingly crude oil rather than products or natural gas liquids.  Asterisk denotes author’s 
judgement of existence of severe current or potential internal conflicts.  “Mbl” and “kbl” mean million barrels and 
thousand barrels.  Percentages do not add to 100% because of rounding error.  Source: Monthly Energy Review, May 
2003.             
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this result.  First, American consumption continues to grow, and is now about 7 billion barrels 
per year.15  Second, production continues to fall in Alaska and in the lower 48 states. 
Imports (less exports) must continue to grow, even in the hypothetical event of stabilized 
U.S. consumption.  Oil production in the Alaskan National Wildlife Refuge would be costly in 
both economic and environmental terms, but would only slow (not reverse) this trend of growing 
imports.  The current U.S. imports come from four continents.  China is the only major oil 
producer which does not export petroleum to the U.S.; China is also a net importer.  Table 11 
shows the 13 leading sources of U.S. petroleum imports.  Eight of the 13 areas are now involved 
in war or major internal conflict.  The Appendix A lists all of the companies importing crude oil 
into the U.S. in 2002, with their total imports and imports from the Persian Gulf.  Given the 
broad corporate network which handles world trade in crude and products, major production 
losses in any one exporting country do not necessarily cause significant supply problems for 
importing countries.  (British Petroleum, owner of 80% of Prudhoe Bay production, is not 
considered a major importer because it produces U.S. oil for use in the U.S.) 
 
V.  The $60 Trillion Prize 
Persian Gulf oil is the lowest cost petroleum in the world.  It is less than $5 per barrel.16 
These cost figures in Table 12 include exploration, capital investment, a return on capital, and a 
risk allowance.  Throughout the Persian Gulf every dollar above $5 is a dollar of additional 
profit. If the price is $45 the additional profit above a normal profit is $40.17 
Assume that $40 per barrel represents the profit from Persian Gulf crude oil over the remainder 
of the century.  This gives an indicative figure of the value of remaining resources in the Persian 
                                                          
15 We use 26% of world consumption, a percentage which has not changed in 20 years.  U.S. and world 
consumption have grown at the same rate.  
16 Based on data in the Financial Times, February 21, 2003 (page 3), the comparable cost for Iraq is $2.40 per barrel 
before shipping. 
17 In economic terminology, this is considered to be either producer surplus, or economic rent. 
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 Table 12.  Illustrative Production Cost 
 
 
 
 
Possible Low Persian Gulf 
Cost 
 
Possible North Sea Cost 
 
Investment in Development, 
amortized (including profit) 
 
55¢ 
 
$10 
 
Operations, lifting 
 
25¢ 
 
$5 
 
Shipping 
 
$2.00 
 
included in operations 
 
Total (rounded) 
 
$3.00 
 
$15 
 
Source:  Chapman and Khanna (2000) and Chapman (1993). 
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Gulf: $61 trillion.18  It is a result of multiplying the remaining resource estimates in Table 9 by 
$40.  Because production costs are so low in the Gulf, the Table 13 values are almost wholly 
producer surplus.  
This, then, is the global problem:  $61 trillion in oil wealth, in an area with 120 million 
people.  In general terms, this is a serious world concern.  The $61 trillion has been an attraction 
to Western oil companies and governments.  It was the goal of the Iraq invasions of Kuwait and 
Iran.  For the governments of the Gulf, recognition of the threats to their stability led to their 
acquisition of considerable weaponry in the 1990s, and their alliance with the United States.  At 
the same time, the continuation of monarchies and dictatorships has been associated with the 
growth of Al Qaeda, and the armed attacks against the U.S. on September 11, 2001 in the U.S., 
and elsewhere. 
The problems of production and price stability have been solved in a reasonable 
economic framework.  However, political instability, the spread of nuclear and conventional 
weapons, and the growing ferocity of the military conflicts and terrorist activities in, or 
originating in the region show us that a breakdown of civil authority will lead to a collapse of the 
economic framework of Persian Gulf oil exports.  There are three broadly different approaches to 
the problem. 
 
VI.  Roads to the Future 
The three broad roads of choice have already seen heavy use.  I describe them as the “hands off” 
(or autonomy) approach, the American security framework, and an international framework.  
 
A.  Autonomy: “Hands Off” 
 Autonomy suggests self-government and sovereignty for each individual country.  It 
implies that other nations do not seek to dominate the region; or, if they seek to do so, they are 
unsuccessful.  The years 1973-1990 roughly approximate this picture.   
                                                          
18 Discounting of course gives different values.  In one optimal control analysis where rising demand curves 
intersect a sequence of supply curves under a fixed constraint of remaining world oil of 3 trillion barrels, the 
discounted values are of course smaller than the Table 13 figures.  See Chapman, December 2001, op. cit. 
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Table 13.  Persian Gulf Petroleum Wealth 
(trillion dollars) 
 
 
 
Method    Iraq  Saudi  Eight Persian 
       Arabia Gulf Nations 
 
 
A.  $40 per barrel   $10 T  $26 T   $61 T  
        Undiscounted profit 
 
 
B.  Discounted supply  $2 T   $5 T   $12 T 
         demand equilibria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: “T” means trillion dollars.  For comparison, total world GDP was estimated to be $31 T in 2001, by the 
World Bank.  $40 barrel profit represents $45 average future price less $5 cost.  For method B, see footnote 18. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In petroleum management, the Gulf nations and OPEC sought to organize world oil 
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prices and production from 1973 (the “Oil Embargo”) to 1986 (Table 2).  For most of this period 
the West reacted to OPEC initiatives by developing alternative but high-cost oil supplies in 
Alaska and the North Sea.  Mexico and Russia became major exporters.  These two 
developments (OECD oil in the North Sea and Alaska, the emergence of major exports from 
Mexico and Russia) unraveled OPEC’s hopes to control prices.  In 1986 then-Vice President 
George H. Bush organized the OECD/OPEC price framework (Figure 3, Table 3) which 
continues to the present. 
 Persian Gulf governments more or less pursued their own destiny as they saw it during 
this period.  Iran replaced its monarchy, which had itself been reintroduced with the active 
support of the US-CIA.  Iraq (with minor support from the US-CIA) changed its government 
from a military dictatorship supported by communists, to a Baath party dictatorship (Table 1).  
Iraq invaded Iran. The U.S. sold arms to Iran in the Iran-Contra program, and provided limited 
support to Iraq in its war with Iran.  The other Gulf states continued as oil exporters under 
independent monarchies dominated by leading families, without major civil disturbances. 
 The severe defect in this approach was made evident by Iraq.  As we saw above (Table 
9), Iraq sought control of Persian Gulf oil.  It saw a $60 trillion prize, and fought to seize it 
through war.  The Iraq-Iran war dead are thought to be one million; Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait 
and the first Gulf War to remove Iraq from Kuwait added perhaps another 100,000 dead.  All 
together, the first two Iraqi wars killed a million combatants and civilians, more or less.  
National borders and world oil markets remained essentially unchanged.  
Any global policy which leaves Persian Gulf nations undefended invites future 
aggression from within or without the region, with the goal of that aggression to seize and hold 
oil wealth.  Of course aggression by Iraq is not today a threat to global stability.  But the prize 
remains, and the nuclear and conventional weaponry in the region continue to expand. 
Those future aggressions are not visible today.  Would a regional power (Turkey, Israel, 
Pakistan, India?) seek to appropriate a share of petroleum wealth?  Could Russia revive its old 
goals of power and influence in Iran and Iraq?  Is it possible that at some future date one or more 
Western nations could make an effort to secure a share of the Gulf’s oil?  Another of the Gulf 
states? 
If the Persian Gulf were to experience a return to the international laissez faire conditions 
of 1973-1990, the only certainty is that new efforts will be made to lay hold of the oil.  These 
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new efforts would involve the increasingly destructive power of conventional weaponry, and a 
possibility of use of the growing arsenal of nuclear weapons. 
This, then, is the powerful force which leads to the need for a Persian Gulf security 
framework.  Consideration of equity and practicality leads to several desirable characteristics of 
a security system: 
1. Stable oil production and the continuation of a price range mutually acceptable to 
OECD consumers and Gulf exporters. 
2.  A level of revenues sufficient for Persian Gulf governments. 
3.  Sufficient military power to deter wars of expropriation of Gulf oil. 
4. Political or military mechanisms to reduce the growing nuclear threat in the region. 
5. Institutional protection against control of oil by the providers of military security. 
6. Governments in the Gulf which are supported by their citizens.  
 
B.  An American Security Framework 
 Can the United States provide the necessary security?  The United States has significant 
assets which support an affirmative position on the issue.  Most importantly, the U.S. has 
demonstrated military strength which is clearly adequate to deter or defeat any Persian Gulf 
nation or regional power which might consider the pursuit of Gulf oil. 
On two other conditions, an American framework would be satisfactory for the 
foreseeable future.  The target price range with stable world supply is continuing as the 
occupation of Iraq evolves.  In addition, revenues to Persian Gulf governments continue at levels 
acceptable to them. 
 The implications of the other three conditions are less supportive of a unilateral 
American security structure.   India and Pakistan may feel that with America’s attention focused 
on the Persian Gulf, they each might consider expanding their nuclear arsenals without 
provoking a strong negative reaction from the U.S.  For Iran, the presence of American armed 
forces on 10 of its borders is of strong concern.  The acquisition of nuclear weapons will appeal 
to some in Iran’s leadership as a means to deter possible U.S. invasion. 
 For Russia, China, and perhaps France, the maintenance or expansion of nuclear weapons 
capability will seem a potential counterweight to growing American power.  Overall, an 
American security framework in the Persian Gulf is likely to expand rather than reduce nuclear 
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weapons capabilities, regionally and globally. 
 The implications of the fifth condition – protection against control of Persian Gulf oil by 
the providers of military security – are perhaps impossible to evaluate today.  The next few 
months of the American occupation will give some insight into future management of Iraqi oil 
by the U.S.  
 The last condition of popular support for Persian Gulf governments is particularly 
challenging.  If the American goal is the protection of stable global oil markets at reasonable 
prices, then there is logical motivation to endeavor to encourage the democratization of 
governments in the Gulf.  Non-economic goals may constitute a second motivation which leads 
the U.S. on a quest for democratization throughout the region. 
 A still different outcome might be that democracy and elections in some Gulf countries 
could bring to power governments fundamentally opposed to the U.S.  As outlined above, Al 
Qaeda’s political support is based upon its fervent opposition to Gulf monarchies, American 
influence, and secularism.  An American security system linked to a continuation of the 
monarchies would seem to accelerate popular support for Al Qaeda-type policies and actions.   
 
C.  An International Security Framework 
 An international approach would have some potential advantages.  Given the success to 
date with the current price range system (see Section II above), an international approach ought 
to be able to manage stable oil production and prices, and sufficient revenues for Gulf 
governments.  With participation from the U.S. and others, it would be able to deter wars of 
appropriation of Gulf oil.  As an international group, it would be well placed to forestall control 
of the region’s oil by security providers in the international organization.  If an international 
framework is satisfactory on these points, then the motivation for nuclear weapons in the region 
is reduced. 
 The last requirement seems most problematic: how would an international organization 
lead to increased democratization and governments which have a greater degree of popular 
support by their citizens?  Would more democratic governments and elections need to be 
imposed upon the region?  Would this, in turn, lead to greatly reduced incentives for Al Qaeda-
type organizations?  Or would the opposite occur with greater public participation, would there 
be a growth in hostility towards the U.S. and increased terrorism? 
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 The elephant in this concept, certainly, is the nonexistence of any organization of the type 
hypothesized.  Any important and successful international structure must have the U.S. playing a 
leadership role, and that generality applies here.  American participation must be significant both 
militarily and organizationally.  The military dimension is perceivable as something roughly 
patterned after NATO.  As with NATO, a Persian Gulf Organization would include major 
military powers, and also nations that see themselves as in need of military protection.  As with 
NATO, the organization would incorporate former enemies.  Just as NATO now includes Poland 
and Germany, Greece and Turkey, a Gulf organization would incorporate Iraq, Kuwait, Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, and the other Gulf states. 
 There are also partial parallels here with the World Trade Organization, the European 
Union, OPEC, the 1991 Persian Gulf Coalition, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the UN 
Security Council as well as with NATO. 
 Use “PGO” to suggest a Persian Gulf Organization or Authority.  Potential participants 
would be the 8 Persian Gulf States, the U.S., the U.K., China, France, Japan, Germany, Russia, 
and perhaps members from Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East.  It might be financed by 
a tax on oil exported from the Gulf.  Such revenues (both tax revenue and revenue from export 
oil sales) could be allocated to Gulf states, and also utilized to support the military forces 
employed to protect and stabilize the Persian Gulf. 
 Consider a current price of $30 per barrel at a tanker loading facility in the Gulf.  This is 
at the high end of the existing price range framework.  The revenues might be distributed as 
suggested in Table 14, with a total illustrative figure of $180 billion as annual revenue associated 
with the current Gulf export level of 6 billion barrels.  The $30 figure could be seen as the 
current (June 2003) $25 price for Saudi oil, plus an additional $5 tax. 
 The first item in part B of the Table provides for the costs of production, development, 
risk, and profit.  The $5 figure is higher than the $3 estimate in Table 12.  Iran may be at or 
above a $5 cost; Iraq and Saudi Arabia may be lower.  General inflation will work to increase 
this amount, while continuing technological innovation will work to lower production cost.   
Table 14.  Hypothetical Illustration of Allocation of Persian Gulf Revenue by 
a Persian Gulf Organization or Authority. 
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A.  Assume:  6 Billion Barrels Exported @ $30 per Barrel.  Revenue Equals 
$180 Billion Annually. 
 
 
B.  Illustration of Revenue Allocation 
  
#1.  $30 B to oil production, development, profit ($5 per barrel). 
 
 #2.  $90 B as revenue to Persian Gulf States ($15 per barrel). 
 
 #3.  $60 B as support for military expense ($10 per barrel). 
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Ultimately, in some future decade, depletion will cause an increase in cost.  But now and for the 
next few years $5 is a reasonable approximation of cost (including a return to capital) for the 
region. 
 Second:  $90 billion as revenue to Persian Gulf states.  This may be equal to or slightly 
less than existing regional expenditures on civilian government functions.  One consequence of 
an effective PGO-type entity would be major reductions on military costs incurred by Gulf 
states, establishing a much higher proportion of petroleum revenues available for nonmilitary 
and security purposes. 
Third:  $60 billion available each year as financial support to the providers of Persian 
Gulf security.  This ought to approximate U.S. annual military expenditures for Persian Gulf 
security during the non-war years 1992 to September 2001.19 
 The current unilateral U.S. security system inherently manifests what economists call the 
“Free Rider Problem”20.  The major consumers of Persian Gulf oil are Europe, Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines (Table B2 in Appendix B).  As long as the U.S. (and to a 
lesser extent the U.K.) manage security, there is no incentive for these countries that consume 
Persian Gulf oil to participate financially in security measures. 
Similarly, the political and human cost is borne by the U.S. and Persian Gulf states, and 
not those regions that actually depend upon and use Persian Gulf oil. 
The unilateral approach suffers from a serious political defect.  The U.S. will experience 
considerable difficulty in attaining legitimacy as the sole governing authority in Iraq and 
possibly in other Gulf states.  In contrast, a multilateral system would have lesser problems with 
legitimacy, internationally and in the Gulf region itself. 
The conditions outlined on page 29 seem to be best met by a multilateral approach.  
However, any multilateral or international security structure in the Persian Gulf must have the 
U.S. as a leader and supporter, militarily and politically.  The international political difficulties 
surrounding the issues of Iraqi weapons, inspection, disarmament, and occupation all indicate the 
problems to be encountered in establishing an international system.  There is no certainty that an 
                                                          
19 In 1992, Darwin Hall estimated the incremental cost of Persian Gulf military expenditures for the U.S. to be $10 
per barrel (adjusted to 1995 prices); D. Hall, November 1992 Energy Policy, 20(11) 1089-1096.  In the mid ‘90s, 
Michael O’Hanlon estimated the military cost to the U.S. for Persian Gulf security to be $50 billion annually (New 
York Times December 30,1995, and September 18, 1996).  Also see Chapman and Khanna 2000, page 7. 
20 A point suggested by Richard Fullerton. 
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international structure is feasible with U.S. leadership; it cannot be considered without U.S. 
leadership.   
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Appendix A.  Company Network Importing Oil into the U.S., 
  Total and Persian Gulf 
 
 
January - December 2002 
(Thousands of Barrels) 
 
 
    
Totals: 3,302,012 802,891 24% 
    
Company Total Persian Gulf %Persian Gulf 
Chevron Corp 264,555 133,243 50% 
Motiva Enterprises LLC 246,619 203,527 83% 
Phillips 66 Co 233,958 24,842 11% 
Exxon Co USA 219,197 70,758 32% 
Mobil Oil Corp 201,803 9,204 5% 
Sunoco Inc 198,113 2,428 1% 
Valero Mktg & Supply Co 195,576 120,088 61% 
Marathon Ashland Petro LLC 170,267 77,313 45% 
Amoco Oil Co 156,733 32,861 21% 
Flint Hills Resources LP 138,454 7,898 6% 
Citgo Petro Corp 130,634 13,421 10% 
Shell Oil Co 110,102   
Conoco Inc 95,155 617 1% 
Lyondell Citgo Refg LP 89,117 9,525 11% 
Phillips Petro Co 85,454 14,564 17% 
Port Arthur Coker Co 61,243 2,969 5% 
Company Total Persian Gulf %Persian Gulf 
BP Oil Supply Co 52,970 2,260 4% 
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Atofina Petrochemicals Inc 46,018 19,009 41% 
The Premcor Refg Group Inc  44,039 6,313 14% 
Orion Rfng Corp  44,007 1,447 3% 
El Paso Merchant Energy-Petro  42,490   
Arco Prod Co 38,080 6,095 16% 
Murphy Oil USA Inc 36,810 7,012 19% 
Chalmette Refg LLC  32,387   
Tesoro Petro Corp  30,311   
Citgo Asph Refg Co  23,978   
PDV Midwest Refg LLC  23,794  517 2% 
Equiva Tradg Co 21,383   
United Refg Co 21,286   
Tesoro Hawaii Corp 19,233   
Williams Refg & Mktg LLC 18,628   
Cenex Harvest States Coop 16,827   
Shell Chem LP  16,766   
Diamond Shamrock Refg & Mktg  15,522 2,415 16% 
Lion Oil Co 12,508 12,508 100% 
Shell US Tradg Co 12,161   
Crown Central Petro Corp  11,774   
Ultramar Inc  11,249 632 6% 
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Company Total Persian Gulf %Persian Gulf 
Hunt Crude Oil Supply Co  10,627 5,370 51% 
Sinclair Oil Corp  10,460   
TPI Petro Inc  9,805 7,515 77% 
Giant Yorktown Inc  9,007    
Fina Oil & Chem Co 8,882 4,039 45% 
Frontier Oil & Refg  8,438   
Ergon Refg Inc  6,638   
Strategic Petro Reserve  5,767   
Koch Supply & Trading Co  5,656 1,039 18% 
Trigeant Ltd  5,421   
Vitol S A Inc 4,667   
Shell Oil Prodts US  4,499   
Bayoil USA Inc  3,462 3,462 100% 
Edgington Oil Co  3,235   
Farmland Indus Inc Cra  2,553   
Montana Refg Co  2,183   
Nexen Mktg  1,903   
Flying Petro Inc 1,653   
Statoil Mktg & Trdg (US) Inc  1,096   
Morgan Stanley Capital Grp Inc 1,074   
Husky Trdg Co  1,004   
NCRA  971   
Atlantic Trdg & Mktg Inc 948   
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Company Total Persian Gulf %Persian Gulf 
Equilon Enterprises LLC  882   
Cannat Energy Inc 664   
Hess Energy Trading Co LLC 548   
Marquest Ltd Ptnrshp 406   
Equistar Chemicals LP 252   
Texaco Refg & Mktg Inc 110   
 
*Notes:  Several factors influence the source of a company's crude oil imports. For example, a company 
like Motiva, which is partly owned by Saudi Refining Inc., would be expected to import a large 
percentage from the Persian Gulf, while Citgo Petroleum Corporation, which is owned by the Venezuelan 
state oil company, would not be expected to import a large percentage from the Persian Gulf, since most 
of their imports likely come from Venezuela. In addition, other factors that influence a specific company's 
sources of crude oil imports would include the characteristics of various crude oils as well as a company's 
economic needs. While, in general, crude oil is fungible, i.e., one crude oil can be substituted for another, 
many refineries are optimized by refining crude oil with specific qualities (e.g., the API gravity, the 
amount of sulfur in the crude oil, etc.). Also, depending on the global crude oil market condition at the 
time, the price difference between heavy and light crude oils varies, thus changing the economic 
dynamics for different refineries. Therefore, many factors determine the source of a company's crude oil 
imports.  The data are based upon operating companies; consequently Chevron and Texaco are separate 
entries; and so are Exxon and Mobil; and BP, Amoco, and Arco. 
 
Source: Reproduced from Energy Information Association, Crude Oil Imports From the Persian Gulf 2002;  
www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/company_level_imports/current/summary2002.html>. 
Accessed May 3, 2003. 
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Appendix B.  Additional Data on International Trade in Petroleum 
 
Table B1.  U.S. International Oil Trade 
(billion barrels, 1999) 
 
Crude Oil Exports To: 
 
Crude Oil Imports From: 
.01 to Japan  .77 from Middle East 
.04 to Philippines .55 from Canada 
.01 to Australia 1.48 from Latin America 
.07 to Europe .02 from China 
.16 to Latin America .63 from Africa 
.07 to Canada * from Russia 
.36 Total  .09 from Pacific 
 .23 from Europe 
 3.80 Total 
 
U.S. Crude Production 2.4 
Crude Oil Imports 3.8 
Refined Product Imports .8 
Products from Natural Gas .7 
Total U.S. Supply  7.4 
U.S. Consumption 7.0 
U.S. Exports .4 
Total U.S. Disposition  7.4 
 
*Note: “*” means less than .005. 
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Table B2.  Middle East Exports 
 
To --- Area Amount 
U.S .77 
Europe 1.69 
Japan 1.54 
Philippines/Taiwan/Asia 2.27 
Australia .06 
Latin America .21 
Africa .24 
Other (Canada, other) .05 
Total  6.83 
 
 
*Note: Persian Gulf production is 85.5% of Middle East production.  Data for 2001, from MER January 
2003. 
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Table B3.  Japanese Oil Consumption and Imports 
(billion barrels and percents) 
 
A. Imports: Amounts, and Percent of Consumption 
 
Middle East 1.54 75% 
Indonesia/Pacific .31 15% 
China .06 3% 
Latin America .02 1% 
Africa .01 * 
U.S. .01 * 
Europe * * 
Russia * * 
 
B. Japan Production, Percent of Consumption 
     
.005 *  
 
 
C. Japanese Consumption         2.04       100%  
 
  
 
 
*Notes: “*” means less than .005 Bbl/y, or less than one-half of 1%.  Data for 1999.  Sources are IPE 
2000 and MER January 2003.  Consumption exceeds production plus imports by .07; probably due to 
rounding, and different sources. 
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Table B4.  Western Europe: Trade in Oil 
(billion barrels) 
 
            
EXPORTS TO:   IMPORTS FROM:  
U.S. .23  Middle East 1.69 
Canada .13  Africa 1.01 
Russia .08  Russia .69 
Africa .06  Latin America .17 
Japan *  U.S. .07 
Philippines/Asia .02  Canada * 
Latin America .02  Total   3.63 
Total  .53    
CONSUMPTION:  5.54  PRODUCTION: 2.31 
Total Consumption 
and Exports: 
6.07  Total Production 
and Imports: 
5.94 
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Table B5.  Global Oil Trade, 1999 
(billion barrels) 
 
 
 
Produced and Consumed in Country of Origin: 10 42% 
Traded in World Markets: 14 58% 
Total Production/ Consumption: 24 100% 
 
 
 
Sources: IPE 2000, MER January 2003 
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Table B6.  World Leading Oil Producers 
 
Country Rank Bbl/y 
Saudi Arabia 1 2.8 
Russia 2 2.7 
U.S. 3 2.1 
China 4 1.2 
Mexico 5 1.2 
Norway 6 1.1 
Venezuela 7 .9 
UK 8 .8 
UAE 9 .7 
Nigeria 10 .7 
Kuwait 11 .7 
Indonesia 12 .4 
Total  15.3 
 
 
 
 
 
*Note:  Neutral zone production split 50-50 between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.  These are countries with 
at least one million bl/d production in 2002.  Total World Production was 24.4 Bbl. 
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Table B7.  Population, GDP, Oil Production and Revenue 
 
Country 
GDP per 
capita 
2001 
Population 
(millions) 
2001 
GDP 
($billions) 
2001 
Oil 
Production 
Bbl 
2001 
Revenue @ 
$25/bl 
Bahrain $9,370 0.7 6.2 0.1 $3B 
Iran $1,750 64.7 112.9 1.4 $35B 
Iraq $1,861 23.8 44.3 0.9 $23B 
Kuwait $18,030 2.0 35.8 0.7 $18B 
Oman $6,091 2.5 15.2 0.3 $8B 
Qatar $18,000 0.6 10.8 0.3 $8B 
Saudi Arabia $7,230 21.4 149.9 2.9 $73B 
UAE $18,000 3.0 54.1 0.8 $20B 
  118.7 429.9 7.4 $188B 
  
 
 
*Notes:  The average per capita income: $3,600.  The Oil Revenue as a % of GDP: 43.7%.  For Iraq and 
Oman, GDP is estimated (very roughly) as the product (a) population, and (b) the midpoint of the per 
capita GNI range reported for each country by the World Bank.  For Qatar and UAE, per capita is taken 
to be equivalent to that of Kuwait, $18,030 per capita. 
